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i Printed in Great Britain
'SAFETY FIRST': BALDWIN, THE
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, AND THE 1929
GENERAL ELECTION
i PHILIP WILLIAMSON
University of Durham
The Conservative party's preparations for the 1929 general election have been
harshly treated by historians. Because the election was lost, they have
understandably concentrated on explaining the defeat and so looked for
weaknesses in Conservative leadership, policies and organization. It is also
understandable that in the light of subsequent economic analysis, the Con-
servative election platform of Safety First' has suffered badly from comparison
with the Keynesian-style policies of the Liberal party programme, We can
conquer unemployment. But the contention here is that all too easily such hindsight
has impeded a proper understanding of Conservative policies and tactics.
The object is not to judge the appropriateness of Conservative policies to the
economic conditions of 1929, nor the effectiveness of the Conservative election
campaign as a vote-winner. Subsequent events showed these to be inadequate,
but it should not be assumed that their inadequacy would have been evident
to Conservatives at the time. So the intention is simply to describe what
leading Conservatives actually thought, and to explain why they acted as they
did, during the approach to the election - and thereby to question easy
explanations of'Safety First'.
I
The normal interpretation of the course of Baldwin's second ministry is that
it began in 1924-5 with what was, for a Conservative government, an
unusually energetic and enlightened period. But then after the General Strike
in May 1926 it fell into a state of reaction, internal dissension and lack of
purpose, partly caused by a deterioration in Baldwin's leadership.1 Since such
constructive measures as were achieved during this second period, notably
de-rating and local government reform, did not prove to be election winners,
Lord Blake has accused Baldwin of being a ' bad tactician' in introducing
'unpopular legislation'just before the election. Poor by-election results from
1927 are said to have demonstrated the government's decline, and increased
1
 For the chief examples see Charles Loch Mowat, Britain between the wars 1918-1940
(London, 1955), pp. 346-7,351; Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin. A biography (London,
1969), pp. 477, 507-8, 515-6; John Ramsden, The age of Balfour and Baldwin (London, 1978), pp.
285-8.
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the party's demoralization. But the party leaders are seen as too supine to do
anything about this loss of prestige, let alone have new ideas for dealing with
the foremost political problem, that of unemployment. Baldwin could not even
bring himself to reconstruct the cabinet. Consequently the party is depicted
as approaching the general election of May 1929 without confidence, inspira-
tion, or even a respectable programme.2 Robert Rhodes James says that 'it
cannot be pretended that Baldwin's leadership was notable or energetic'.
According to John Ramsden, no arrangements were made for party research,
which meant that preparations for the election began late and had to be left
largely to civil servants unversed in the demands of election politics. As a result,
he continues, the party had no coherent policies to offer, and so had ' no option'
but to adopt a defensive stance, fighting on its record and under the slogan
of'Safety First'. While doubting whether there was really anything to fear,
he then follows most other accounts in assuming that the appeal was directed
against socialism.3
On this last point, however, there are alternative interpretations, both of
which claim that ' Safety First' involved more calculation than is normally
recognized. John Campbell agrees that it was defensive, but regards it as the
'considered riposte' to the 'supposed recklessness' of Lloyd George and to the
'boldness' of his programme. He is, however, in that tradition of admirers of
the interwar'economic radicals' which tends to dismiss opposition to the ideas
of Lloyd George, Mosley and Keynes as the product of blind inertia, wilful
ignorance or moral failure. So he considers that Baldwin 'never could be
bothered to go to the heart of the country's problems', and that Conservative
objections to Liberal policies were just part of their general 'determination not
to try to overcome [difficulties]'. In contrast, Michael Bentley emphasizes the
role of political tactics, writing that ' the Conservatives made a conscious
attempt to eradicate all traces of policy in order to appear stolid and silhouette
Lloyd George as a very dangerous thing'. But even this observation does not
convey the full significance of'Safety First', and since it appears with little
further elucidation in a book about Liberal politics, is unlikely to make much
impression on the standard interpretation.4
There remains, then, a story of drift and decline, ending in a weak election
2
 Robert Blake, The Conservative party from Peel to Churchill (Fontana edn, London, 1970), p. 232;
Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 510-11, 516; Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 287-8, 290-1.
3
 Robert Rhodes James, ed., Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C. C. Davidson's memoirs and papers
1910-37 (London, 1969), p. 300. Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 291-2: see also John
Ramsden, The making of Conservative party policy. The Conservative Research Department since 1929
(London, 1980), pp. 29-30.
4
 John Campbell, Lloyd George. The goat in the wilderness 1922-1931 (London, 1977), pp. 3, 234;
and 'Stanley Baldwin', in John P. Mackintosh, ed., British prime ministers in the twentieth century
(London, 1977),!, 216. Michael Bentley, The Liberal mind 1914-1929 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 114,
which goes on to quote from an important letter by W. Bridgeman, but misses the most revealing
comments: see below, p. 405.
Davidson has it both ways, first explaining why the campaign was concentrated against the
Liberals, then saying that 'Safety First' was aimed at the socialists: Rhodes James, ed., Memoirs
of a Conservative, pp. 301-2.
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I campaign. But closer examination which is dominated neither by knowledge
I of the government's defeat, nor by admiration for Liberal policies, suggests that
l' this account requires substantial modification. It not only shows that the
I government devoted considerable effort to preparing for the election, had a
1 choice of several possible election policies, and was confident of victory, but
{ also that 'Safety First' was a striking example of Baldwin's authority andleadership. For this reason, it will be necessary to begin with a reminder of
Baldwin's attitudes and objectives, particularly as revealed by his public
speeches.
II
For Baldwin, politics in the 1920s were overwhelmingly dominated by two
problems. The first was that as a result of the 1918 Representation of the
People Act, the political parties, the country's institutions, the people's liberty,
the possibilities for economic and social progress and, indeed, the very existence
of English civilization, were all at the mercy of a vast, new, politically
uneducated electorate, which might easily be misled into destroying them by
ignorance, selfishness, or the fallacies of demagogues. Baldwin repeatedly
warned that democracy was an ' experiment': it was balanced on a ' knife edge'
between anarchy and tyranny, and could survive only if the electorate under-
stood their own responsibilities, and learnt to recognize and have faith in
responsible political leaders. A familiar extract from a private letter of June
1927 summarized Baldwin's many public statements on these subjects:
'Democracy has arrived at a gallop in England, and I feel all the time that
it is a race for life; can we educate them before the crash comes?'5
The existence of this raw democracy greatly aggravated the danger from the
second problem: that the natural evolution of industry into massive conglom-
erations of capital and labour, and the hardships of prolonged economic
depression had coincided to embitter relations between workers and employers,
and to increase the likelihood of class warfare.6 Baldwin's most positive attempt
to relieve this depression, by adopting general protection, was rejected at the
1923 election. After that disaster he had doubts about the political acceptability
of any variety of protection - even safeguarding of individual industries - and
he reverted to conventional economic ideas. Since the British economy was
'absolutely dependent' on foreign trade, recovery would be achieved partly
by the restoration of international trading and financial stability - through
political agreement in Europe, settlement of war-debts and reparations, and
return to the gold standard - and partly by British industries regaining their
5
 Baldwin to Irwin, 20 June 1929, Halifax papers, microfilm in Churchill College, Cambridge,
A4/410/14.2. For public statements, see especially Stanley Baldwin, On England and other addresses
(London, 1926), pp. 70-1, 151, 163 (speeches of 4 Dec. 1924, 27 Sept. 1923 and 28 Nov. 1924);
Our inheritance. Speeches and addresses (London, 1928), pp. 9, 13, 128-9 (speeches of 19 June 1926
and6Aug. i927);and This torch offreedom. Speeches and addresses (London, 1935), pp. 308-11 (speech
of 10 Mar. 1928).
• Baldwin, On England, pp. 27-32, 41-5 (speeches of 5 and 6 Mar. 1925).
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international competitiveness. He was less conventional in warning not just
that strikes jeopardized recovery, but also that the rationalization of industries
and the cuts in production costs needed to restore competitiveness and so ensure
long-term prosperity and social improvement could in the short-term generate
still more industrial tension. Recovery would be impossible without co-
operation between both sides of industry. In other words, the key to the
economic problem was industrial relations. And because failure here might
precipitate social conflict, they were also crucial for the future of democracy.
Again Baldwin's public declarations were supported by private testimony that
his 'main ambition' was 'to prevent the class war becoming a reality'.7
Baldwin, then, believed that the two central problems, of democracy and
industry, were both primarily matters of education, conciliation and co-
operation. It was therefore in these areas that he concentrated his efforts; and
in doing so, he exercised originality and imagination.
As a Conservative, his first important step was to accept the arrival of
democracy and the changes in industrial structure, and their corollary, the
emergence of a powerful Labour party and trade union movement. But they
were accepted only in so far as they were genuinely English growths. Baldwin
talked a great deal about England and its countryside, people, literature and
history. His aim was to evoke common traditions and shared experiences, in
order to strengthen the sense of social cohesion, to exalt the reputedly innate
English virtues of individual initiative, common sense, tolerance, compromise
and class harmony, and to celebrate England as the birthplace of true liberty.8
This 'vision' was not static or 'escapist'.9 Recognizing that structural
transformations were inevitable, he was appealing for them to be facilitated
by the maintenance of time-honoured qualities: believing that socialism could
not be contained by outright resistance or legislative safeguards, he was trying
to counteract and tame it by persuasion and the presentation of alternative
ideals.10 So in general the Labour movement was treated - even welcomed - as
a natural product of these qualities, and one manifestation of the aspirations
of the English people. But those elements within it which provoked hatred and
class conflict, or aimed at the imposition of state control, were denounced as
foreign intrusions, wholly alien to the English character, to English conditions
and to the English experience of liberty.11
7
 Baldwin speeches of 27 July 1923 and 13 June 1924, quoted in Middlemas and Barnes,
Baldwin, pp. 170, 268; Baldwin, On England, pp. 16, 26-7, 32-9, 46-7, 66-9 (speeches of 12 Jan.,
5, 6 and 13 Mar. 1925). Baldwin's statement in 1924, reported in Robert Boothby, I fight to live
(London, 1947), p. 36.
8
 Especially Baldwin, On England, pp. 1-9 (speech of 6 May 1924).
9
 Campbell, 'Baldwin', p. 210.
10
 E.g. Baldwin, On England, pp. 31-4, 44-52, 66-8 (speeches of 5, 6 and 13 Mar. 1925); and
interview of 16 May 1924, quoted in H. Montgomery Hyde, Baldwin. The unexpected prime minister
(London, 1973), p. 213. For safeguards, see e.g. Baldwin reported on 21 June 1927 in Keith
Middlemas, ed., Thomas Jones. Whitehall diary, u (London, 1969) [hereafter cited as Jones diary],
103.
11
 Baldwin, On England, pp. 2, 59-60, 153-4 (speeches of 6 May 1924, 16 Feb. and 27 Sept.
1923), and Our inheritance, pp. 10-12, 215-18, 223-4 (speeches of 19 and 12 June 1926).
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These speeches about the qualities common to all Englishmen were also
intended to demonstrate that it was easy for workers and employers to
understand each other's problems and co-operate in their solution, if there was
but the will to try. For it was only from discussions between the men with
intimate working knowledge of industry that mutual understanding and
co-operation could arise: this could not be imposed by legislation or edict.
Governments did not have the information and experience to direct industry
efficiently, and anyway their intervention would destroy the individual
initiative and enterprise necessary for recovery. So industry could look only
to itself for the solution of its problems, which were as much to do with defective
management as with restrictive labour practices. At most the government
could provide the framework and encouragement for discussion.12
All this emphasis on the peace-loving and commonsensical character of the
people was partly an act of faith by Baldwin. But it was also an obvious attempt
to convert his audiences to seeing themselves in these terms. Even the English
had human frailties, and much depended on the responsibility with which they
were led. If a ' sound and sane democracy' was to be established, electors would
have to feel confidence in their political leaders, and in order to earn this trust
politicians would have to be sympathetic, understanding, fairminded, consistent
and honest. JHence Baldwin's preoccupation with the quality of public life.
(•" His insistence upon political morality, truth and respect for pledges, and his
! warnings against rhetoric, 'stunts' and the power of'Press Lords'13 were not
I just devices for attacking his personal enemies. There was a real conviction that
j Lloyd George, Beaverbrook and Rothermere were endangering democracy by
I their lack of principle and cynical exploitation of ignorance.
L^  These, then, were the main points of Baldwin's message. It was a message"
difficult to sustain with any credibility, but he was able to do so by projecting
aspects of his own personality. His reputation as an ordinary, decent, modest,
straightforward, honest, very English Englishman served an important political
purpose, enabling him to embody the qualities he expounded, to establish
contact with the new electorate, and to claim special insight into the thoughts
of the common people.
Of course, a major objective of this appeal was to benefit the Conservative
party and his position within it, to assert that the Liberal party no longer had
any claim to represent the people and that the Labour movement was just a
sectional interest, which would always be liable to infection by class hatred.
But the intention was never simply that, and it did not make his appeal any
the less sincere: it was meant to transcend parties and to point to a shared
interest in peace and co-operation.
It is vital in understanding the 1929 election to realize that Baldwin and
12
 Baldwin, On England, pp. 35-8, 45-9, 67-8 (speeches of 5, 6 and 13 Mar. 1925).
13
 Baldwin, Our inheritance, p. 9 (speech of 19 June 1926); This torch of freedom, pp. 308—11
(speech of 10 Mar. 1928); On England, pp. 93-7, 75-92, 155 (speeches of Mar. 1924, 6 Nov. 1925
and 27 Sept. 1923); Rhodes James, ed., Memoirs of a Conservative, p. 170. For Baldwin saying the
press was a peril to democracy, see Jones to his wife, 23 Oct. 1928, in Jones diary, p. 153.
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other Conservative leaders thought his appeal was highly effective. It was not
just that Baldwin was liked and trusted by many Labour politicians, ranging
from MacDonald to Cook, and was greatly respected by such Liberals as
Asquith, Grey and Maclean.14 Baldwin was persuaded by enthusiastic public
receptions and reports-«f popular feeling that he had - as he told Thomas Jones,
~in._N.oy^mber ij9_22_^J'a good deal of personal backing in the country'.15 And
in the next eighteen months before the election many Conservatives expressed ;
a belief that what Davidson described as ' the confidence which the public
places in the character and integrity of Baldwin' was a great advantage to the)
party.16
— Neville Chamberlain's opinion of Baldwin was particularly significant. More
than most other Conservative ministers, he believed in having definite policies
and programmes: in 1924 he had taken a leading part in party research and
had drafted the election programme. Yet he also had great faith in Baldwin's
popular appeal. He thought Baldwin had ' a real flair for the way things would
appear to the man in the street', and in August 1928 wrote that his speeches
are enjoyed and admired by all parties and particularly perhaps by Liberals. Therein
lies a tremendous asset to our party.. .it is the Prime Minister who by his character
and his speeches keeps for us the great little army of mugwumps and thereby will, I trust,
win for us the next election.17
I l l
The Conservative government's concessions to reactionary party pressures
in 1927 should not be exaggerated. The Trade Disputes Bill in March seemed
the natural reaction to the T.U.C.'s rejection of Baldwin's peace gestures by
calling a General Strike, but it did not weaken his efforts for industrial
conciliation: he represented the defeat of the strike as a triumph for the common
sense of the people and a further step in their education, and he encouraged
14
 For Labour, see e.g. MacDonald to Villiard, 4 June 1923, quoted in M. S. Venkataramani,
'Ramsay MacDonald and Britain's domestic politics and foreign relations 1919-1931', Political
Studies, VIH (i960), 246; J. R. Clynes, Memoirs (London, 1937), n, 251; T. Graham, Willie Graham
(London, n.d.), p. 94; Laski to Holmes, 6 June and 29 Dec. 1926, in M. Howe, ed., Holmes-Laski
letters: The correspondence of Mr Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski 1916-1935 (London, 1953), 11, 827,
908-9; C. V. Wedgwood, The last of the radicals. Josiah Wedgwood M.P. (London, 1951), p. 220;
G. M. Young, Stanley Baldwin (London, 1952), p. 102 for Tillett, Spoor and Cook.
For Liberals, Asquith to Baldwin, 1926, in Young, Baldwin, pp. 52-3; Grey to Baldwin, 5 Jan.
1929, Jones diary, p. 166; and MacLean to Baldwin, 2 Aug. 1926, Baldwin papers, Cambridge
University Library, 161/154.
15
 Jones diary, 18 Nov. 1927, p. 116.
M
 Davidson to Irwin, 3 Dec. 1928, Halifax papers, India Office Library, [Eur.c] 152/18/173
[hereafter references to Halifax papers are to the India Office Library collection, unless otherwise
stated]. For other examples, see Headlam diary, 30 Mar. 1928, Durham County Record Office;
Winterton to Irwin, 12 July 1928, Halifax papers, i52/i8/89a; Steel-Maitland to Irwin, Oct. 1928
(copy), Steel-Maitland papers, Scottish Record Office, GD 193/253; Garvin to Astor, 2
Feb. 1929, Lord Astor papers, Reading University Library.
17
 N. Chamberlain diary, 18 Apr. 1928, N[eville] Cfhamberlain papers], Birmingham Univer-
sity Library. N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 12 Aug. 1928, Halifax papers, 152/18/1143.
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the Mond—Turner talks.18 The Arcos raid and severance of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet government in May may well have been precipitated by
increasing evidence of Russian subversion from deciphered telegrams, rather
than just party agitation.19 Baldwin welcomed the opposition to his govern-
ment's House of Lords reform proposals as educating the diehards in political
realities, and was relieved when they were defeated in July.20 And on the other
hand, the cabinet did commit itself in April to extending democracy, by
equalizing the franchise for women. If the impression was of movement towards
the right, to Conservative leaders the change was in circumstances more than
in policy.
As for divisions in the cabinet and party, Conservatives considered these
less severe and damaging than the differences within the other parties, between
the Labour party leadership and the Independent Labour party, and between
Lloyd George and the Asquithian Liberal Council.21 The resignation of Cecil
from the cabinet in August 1927 over the breakdown of the Geneva naval
disarmament conference aroused little anxiety, largely because he had long
been a difficult colleague. During the next two years, Conservative leaders
clearly thought that continued difficulties over disarmament and relations with
the U.S.A. meant that there was little political advantage to be derived from
the government's foreign policy, and so did not consider making it into a
leading election issue. But there is no evidence to suggest that they feared that
criticism from Cecil and the League of Nations Union would cause the
government any serious damage.
Nor should the impact of by-election defeats be exaggerated. Having won
an exceptionally large majority of over 200 seats at the 1924 election,
Conservatives expected and could afford to lose a good number of seats at
by-elections and at the next general election.28 Moreover, many of the nine
by-election losses fron February 1927 to February 1929 were ascribed to
aEnormal local or temporary conditions, which would not apply at a general
election.23 No leading Conservative thought that these by-elections indicated
18
 Baldwin, Our inheritance, pp. 218-22 (speech of 12 June 1926). G. W. McDonald and Howard
F. Gospel, 'The Mond-Turner Talks, 1927-1933: A study in industrial co-operation', Historical
Journal, xvi (1973), 813-14.
19
 See Christopher Andrew,' The British Secret Service and Anglo-Soviet relations in the 1920s,
part I ' , Historical Journal, xx (1977); and idem, 'How Baldwin's Secret Service Lost the Soviet
Codes', The Observer, 13 Aug. 1978.
20
 Baldwin reported in Jones diary, 21 June and 1 July 1927, pp. 103, 105; and in Buchan to
his mother, 7 July 1927, quoted in Janet Adam Smith, John Buchan: a biography (London, 1965),
P- 3°7-
21
 E.g. Hoare to Irwin, 21 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/205.
22
 E.g. Birkenhead to Irwin, 3 Oct. 1928, in the second Earl of Birkenhead, Frederick Edwin,
Earl of Birkenhead: The last phase (London, 1935), pp . 296-7 .
23
 H. Little to Madachlan, 3 June 1927, copy sent by Davidson to Baldwin, 9 June, Baldwin
papers, 51/77-9, for Bosworth by-election, 31 May; Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 22 Jan. 1928,
NC 18/1/604, ' o r Northampton, 9 Jan.; Davidson to Jackson, 13 Feb. 1928 (copy), Davidson
papers, House of Lords Record Office, for Lancaster, 9 Feb.; Davidson to Baldwin, 8 Mar. 1928,
Baldwin papers, 54/236-7, for Canterbury, 24 Nov. 1927 and Lancaster; Baldwin reported in
Jonesdiary, 1 Nov. 1928, p. I55for Ashton, 29 Oct.; Davidson to Irwin, 3 Dec. 1928, Halifax papers,
152/18/173 for Tavistock, 11 Oct.
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a decisive movement against the government, indeed for most of this period
almost all of them were confident of retaining an overall majority.24
So the actions, divisions and by-election defeats of the government did not
make Conservative leaders fear that it was in any serious state of decline.
However, there was no doubt in early 1927 that the government was losing
its sense of purpose. For several months Baldwin was tired, ill, and even less
inclined than usual to force decisions.25 His hesitations affected the whole
cabinet, particularly over policies which might be controversial within the
party. Cabinet ministers themselves complained about delays and postpone-
ments : Neville Chamberlain specifically over poor law reform, Bridgeman over
factory legislation, Salisbury over House of Lords reform and Percy over the
women's franchise; and Amery, Percy and -Churchill more generally. For
example, Percy warned Baldwin in April that any ' further sign of indecision
would be well-nigh fatal to the Government's reputation'.26
However, something was done about this situation. In June Davidson, the
Conservative party chairman, asked Baldwin to appoint a committee to
consider policies both for the remainder of the parliament, so that the
government could 'go to the country with a good record', and for inclusion
in the election programme.27 Rhodes James remarks that 'no action appears
to have been taken'.28 In fact, a policy committee was appointed, under the
chairmanship of Worthington-Evans, and held its first meeting in September.
It consisted of Davidson and twelve cabinet ministers, some of whom were
joined by several junior ministers and whips on four subcommittees. But
secretaries were provided by the Conservative Central Office, not the cabinet
office: in other words, it was a. party research committee. It is true that when
first asked to suggest items for discussion, committee members offered few new
ideas. It is also true that the committee's work was dilatory, and that the empire
and social reform sub-committees produced little, largely because of Amery's
long absence on an empire tour and Neville Chamberlain's preoccupation with
poor law reform.29 But the agricultural sub-committee did much useful work,
24
 E.g. Davidson to Jackson, 13 Feb. 1928 (copy), Davidson papers. Hoare to Irwin, 30 Mar.
1928 and 21 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/33, 205. Salisbury reported in Lady Hilton Young
diary, 13July 1928, Kennet papers, Cambridge University Library. Churchill and N. Chamberlain
to Baldwin, respectively 2 and 21 Sept. 1928, Baldwin papers, 36/76-7, 163/85-6. Joynson-Hicks
to Irwin, 1 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/195. Baldwin to Irwin, 25 Feb. 1929, Halifax papers,
Churchill College, Cambridge, A4/410/14.3.
26
 Montgomery Hyde, Baldwin, p. 280. Jones diary, 12 Apr. 1927, p. 99.
26
 N. Chamberlain diary, 12 Feb. and 15 Mar. 1927. Bridgeman, Percy, Amery and Churchill
to Baldwin, respectively iojan. , 2 Apr., 10 Apr. and 6June 1927, Baldwin papers, 53/251, 52/
145, 28/251-62, 5/125-35. Salisbury in Cab. 36(27) of 15 June 1927.
27
 Davidson to Baldwin, 13 June 1927, Baldwin papers, 36/66-70.
28
 R h o d e s J a m e s , ed . , Memoirs of a Conservative, p . 299 .
29
 Worthington-Evans to committee members, 13 Sept. 1927 (copy); minutes of first meeting
of'Cabinet Policy Committee', 30 Sept. 1927, but note that despite being described here as a
'cabinet committee', care was taken to distinguish it as a party committee: see Worthington-
Evans to Davidson, 14 Sept. 1927, and to Joynson-Hicks, 18 Nov. 1927 (copies); for policy
suggestions, see committee members to Worthington-Evans, Sept. 1927; for work of sub-committees,
Pembroke-Wicks (secretary) to Worthington-Evans, 19 Apr. 1928: Worthington-Evans papers,
Bodleian Library, [MSS Eng. Hist.] c. 895/60, 61-2, 127-9, 141-3, 66-110, c. 896/19-20.
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and as will be seen the trade and industry sub-committee produced an
important report on safeguarding in July 1928.30
Nevertheless, the policy committee's work was not given great prominence.
The main reason for this was that half its function, of providing a new policy
for the closing sessions of parliament, was pre-empted by Churchill's scheme
for relieving industry and agriculture from their burden of rate payments.
The emergence of this 'de-rating' plan has received detailed examination
from the biographers of Baldwin and Churchill.31 But its purpose has not been
sufficiently emphasized. As proposed in June 1927, and then in more detailed
form in December, it was, first, an employment policy: by removing one
element in the costs of production, it was designed to stimulate industry and
agriculture and so enable them to provide more jobs. Secondly, and more
importantly, it was an election policy. As one of the ministers most worried
by the government's stagnation in 1927 - in June he wrote that its prospects
seemed ' very bleak' - Churchill offered the plan as a means to ' recover
command of the public mind' and ensure a 'successful culmination of [thej
Government in 1929', thereby reducing the risks from 'the caprice of
the. . . electorate'. So the criterion on which Baldwin and the cabinet were asked
to consider the plan was not so much its practicability, as whether or not it
would be 'popular'.32 With the government still in need of new ideas, they
decided in January 1928 that it would be: Cunliffe-Lister and Guinness, the
ministers responsible for industry and agriculture, were especially enthusiastic.33
Even its main critic, Neville Chamberlain, thought that the underlying idea
was 'sound' and that it 'might very advantageously' be included in the
election programme. His main objections were that its immediate introduction
would disrupt his own plans for poor law reform, and later, a purely personal
anxiety, that he was being overborne by Churchill: in March he even
considered resignation.34 But these objections were overcome by Churchill's
eagerness to 'dovetail' their plans and reluctant acceptance of only partial rate
exemption for industry, and by personal reassurances from Baldwin, whose
leadership here was far from ineffective. Baldwin was able to persuade
30
 See below, p. 395. John Ramsden, concentrating on the development of permanent
institutions, has underestimated the importance of my point about this committee: Conservative party
policy, p. 27 and footnote 30.
31
 Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 461-2 and 464-71. Martin Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill, v (London, 1976), 238-84.
32
 Churchill to Baldwin, 6 June and i7Dec. 1927, and 4jan. 1928, Baldwin papers, 5/125-35,
138-9, 146-56. Churchill to N. Chamberlain, 7 June 1927, and to Cunliffe-Lister, 17 Dec. 1927,
in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, v, Companion 1 (London, 1979), i o io -n , 1139. Cab. 2(28)
of 20 Jan. 1928.
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Chamberlain to acquiesce in proposals he disliked, yet left him believing that
his cabinet position had thereby been strengthened.35
The combined de-rating and poor law reform plan, introduced in stages from
the Budget of April 1928 to the Local Government Bill of November, embraced
assistance to industry, agriculture, railways and depressed areas, and a
complete overhaul of the structure and finance of local government. All
Conservatives regarded it as a major constructive achievement, which re-
dounded greatly to the party's advantage. If Chamberlain considered it too
technical to be an election-winner on its own, he at least thought it an
important contribution to that end, in demonstrating that the government still
had ideas and vitality.36 Churchill's unabated confidence in the political merits
of de-rating was shown in repeated attempts to bring forward the full
implementation of the scheme so that its economic benefits would be apparent
before any likely election date. In May Baldwin, who had heard good reports
of the scheme's reception, only restrained him temporarily by advising that the
full benefits would be better left dangling like a ' carrot' before the electorate.37
During the winter 'advanced' Conservatives like Macmillan and Astor
regretted that the government was not making even more political capital from
the scheme; indeed, during the election campaign Astor regarded it as a
'winning card'. Lord Weir, a leading industrialist, considered it 'the biggest
legislative reform of the last fifty years'.38
In the event, new and often higher rate assessments were announced just
before the election, and it has often been said that these damaged the
government, since some electors blamed the increases on de-rating. This may
be true, but there is little evidence to show that, at the time, Conservatives
considered it a serious threat. Few private observations on the matter
exist - which may suggest that there was no widespread alarm - and most of
these were made with hindsight after the election.39
De-rating was not the only employment policy produced by the government
in 1928. In the face of unseasonal increases in unemployment, a setback in'
trade, criticism from the opposition parties and renewed Conservative agitation
for protection, the cabinet in July discussed labour transference to relieve
'
 35
 N. Chamberlain diary, 19 and 20 Apr. 1928.
31
 N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 12 Aug. 1928, Halifax papers, 152/18/1148, and to Ida
Chamberlain, 4 Nov. 1928, NC 18/1/633.
37
 Churchill to Baldwin, 13 May 1928, Baldwin papers, 5/191-4. Baldwin to Churchill, 15 May
1928, in Gilbert, Churchill, v, Companion 1, 1287; and reported in Hankey to Balfour, 16 May
1928, Balfour papers, British Library, Add. MSS 49705/22-8.
38
 Macmillan to Lord R. Cecil, 8 Nov. 1928, Cecil of Chelwood papers, British Library, Add.
MSS 51166/79-80. Astor to Garvin, 31 Jan., 22 and 24 May 1929 (copies), Astor papers. Weir
to Stonehaven, 2 Aug. 1929, in W. J. Reader, Architect of Air Power. The life of the first Viscount Weir
(London, 1968), pp. 150-1.
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depressed areas, export credits to stimulate trade, assisted passages to encourage
emigration, and consultations with bank directors to help raise finance for
rationalization of the steel industry.40 These were not adventurous ideas, but
then the government believed that the permanent reduction of unemployment
was a gradual process dependent on industrial reorganization and trade
expansion, and that anyway in de-rating it already had an enterprising policy.
Indeed, Churchill was at last allowed to bring forward railway de-rating, in
order to give industry the benefit of reduced freight charges in the winter.41
More importantly, when the party's policy committee completed its report
on 16 July, it proposed that de-rating should be supplemented by an extension
of the existing policy of safeguarding individual industries by protective
duties. The committee accepted the agricultural sub-committee's conclusion
that general tariffs and food taxes were still not politically feasible. But it
overcame Davidson's fear of provoking a Liberal free trade attack, and
supported the industry sub-committee's proposal that after the election the
application procedure for safeguarding should be simplified and thrown open
to all industries, even iron and steel, which had been debarred in 1925.
Although the committee recognised that the protectionist agitation was
creating considerable uncertainty, it was undecided on whether these changes
should be announced immediately, or in the election programme.42
So the party leadership already had a new safeguarding policy available
before the protectionist agitation reached a climax in late July. That agitation
was organized by Page-Croft and the parliamentary committee of the Empire
Industries Association, representing about 200 Conservative M.P.s, and
supported in the cabinet by Amery. Originating in support for a renewed
safeguarding application from the iron and steel industry, it rapidly developed
into a demand for an immediate general extension of safeguarding, and seemed
likely to split the party.43 Like Churchill's interest in de-rating, Amery and
the E.I.A. wanted more safeguarding as both an employment and an election
policy. Amery in particular had long berated Baldwin for allowing Churchill
to obstruct advances in protection and imperial economic policies. His remedy
40
 Cabs 35, 36, 39 and 40(28) of 27 June, 4, 18 and 23 July 1928, and associated cabinet
papers.
41
 Cab 40(28) of 23 July 1928.
42
 'Policy committee: agricultural sub-committee report', signed by Guinness, n.d. but July
1928 (copy), 3rd earl of Selborne papers, Bodleian Library. The industrial sub-committee's report
is described in ' Draft conclusions of meeting of the policy committee', 16 July 1928, Worthington-
Evans papers, c. 896/27-32. The two sub-committee reports were forwarded to Baldwin as
enclosures in Worthington-Evans to Baldwin, 24 July 1928 (copy), Worthington-Evans papers,
c. 896/42.
43
 For application from Heavy Steel Makers Safeguarding Committee, see Peat to Baldwin,
3 Apr. 1928; and for their deputation, memo. 21 June 1928, Baldwin papers, 79/116-25 and
170-86. For agitation, Amery diary, 4, 9 and 11 July 1928; Amery to Baldwin, u July 1928,
Baldwin papers, 30/66-70; Page-Croft (on behalf of meetings of E.I.A. M.P.s) to Baldwin, 11,
12 and 23july 1928, the last with a list of 190 supporters, Baldwin papers, 79/195, 197-9, 2 '8~9-
For possible split, Winterton and Lane-Fox to Irwin, 12 and 26 July 1928, Halifax papers,
152/18/893, 102.
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for the government's inertia in early 1927 had been the removal of Churchill
from the Exchequer, and the introduction of the policy which he believed
would not only solve most of the country's economic problems, but also 'secure
for a generation the political power of the Party that is responsible for it, and
condemn to impotence those who have got committed to opposing it'. Now
in July 1928 both he and the E.I.A. leaders asserted that de-rating alone was
an inadequate election policy, and that unless employment was maintained
during the winter by further safeguarding, the party might suffer badly at the
polls.44
On the other side, Churchill and a group of twenty-eight junior ministers
and backbenchers claimed that extension of safeguarding would damage the
party by diverting popular attention from de-rating, and alienating the large
number of free-traders who had voted Conservative in 1924.45 Even most of
those cabinet ministers who were protectionists and wanted further safe-
guarding were anxious to avoid a tariff controversy, fearing that it might cause
a repetition of the 1923 defeat.46
Faced with a crisis, there was again little lacking in Baldwin's leadership.
Determined to put a quick end to the agitation and counteract any impression
that full protection was intended, he denied Amery a cabinet discussion,' flatly
refused' a request from the E.I.A. M.P.s for a debate on iron and steel, and
was 'equally curt' in dealing with a deputation from them on 23 July. This
was sufficient to secure the reluctant acquiescence of Amery and Page-Croft,
who when it came to the point were not prepared to disrupt the government.4'
And when to everyone's surprise and embarrassment Joynson-Hicks, the Home
Secretary, reopened the issue in a characteristically misjudged speech on 28
July, Baldwin was even more firm. According to Amery, he was 'dictatorial'
at a cabinet meeting on 1 August in insisting on the need for cabinet unity,
the desirability of leaving safeguarding to display its practical advantages
without controversy, and the prime importance of expounding de-rating. This
produced apologies from Joynson-Hicks and, on the following day, after Amery
and Churchill had aired their opposing views, agreement to end the uncertainty
by an immediate announcement of the policy committee's proposals for
extending safeguarding after the election.48
The protectionists' agitation, then, did not so much force a policy change
44
 Amery to Baldwin, ioApr. ig27and 11 July 1928, Baldwin papers, 28/251-62 and 30/66-70.
Lord Croft, My life ofstrife (London, 1948), p. 182, and Page-Croft to Baldwin, 27july 1928 (copy),
Croft papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, 1/3/3-5.
45
 Churchill draft letter to Page-Croft, 25 July 1928, Gilbert, Churchill, v, Companion 1,1313-15.
Sandars and others to Baldwin, 17 July 1928, Baldwin papers, 79/207.
4
' E.g. Hailsham reported in Amery diary, 2 Aug. 1928: ' unemployment... could only be
cured by protection [but] . . . the essential thing was to say as little about it as possible and avoid
letting [it] become an issue at the election'.
47
 Amery diary, 11 July 1928. L. S. Amery, Mypolitical life, n (London, 1953), 493-4. Page-Croft
to Baldwin, 27 July 1928 (copy), Croft papers, 1/3/3-5.
48
 For cabinet meeting, Amery diary, 1 and 2 Aug. 1928; Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 5 Aug.
1928, NC 18/1/622; and Cab 43(28) of 2 Aug. 1928. For announcement, Baldwin to Eyres-
Monsell, 3 Aug. 1928, printed in the major newspapers, 5 and 6 Aug.
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upon the government as determine the time when the party's new policy was
announced. This policy fell short of what protectionists wanted and thought
necessary to ensure election success. At the Conservative party conference in
September and during the winter Page-Croft and the E.I.A. renewed their
pressure for more safeguarding before the election.49 Amery threatened
resignation over Baldwin's public explanations of the policy, which stressed that
the objective was not general tariffs, and even after being reassured by him
in September he remained ' disgruntled '.50 But Page-Croft denied any rupture
with the government, and Amery continued to expect a government victory.
Churchill on the other hand felt that the policy went too far, and became
unhappy about his cabinet position and the election prospects.51 For all other
leading Conservatives, however, the compromise on safeguarding was a relief,
since it avoided the electoral risks of a protection-free trade conflict, yet usefully
supplemented de-rating as an industrial and employment policy.52
As the government equipped itself with policies during 1928, it contributed
to a marked increase in Conservative confidence. In June Davidson considered
the position was 'very satisfactory'; during the next two months Chamberlain
and Winterton remarked upon the growing strength of Baldwin's personal
position; at the annual conference the party acclaimed Baldwin and Cham-
berlain, and seemed to be in ' good spirits'; and in October Birkenhead thought
the party situation was 'promising'.53 However, as another hard winter of
unemployment began, depression spread through the lower ranks of the party,
and especially amongst M.P.s and candidates in northern industrial
constituencies.54 Davidson became so worried about this that he was converted
** Resolutions by Page-Croft and others at the party conference, reported in The Times, 28 Sept.
1928. Page-Croft to Baldwin, 2 Nov. 1928 (copy), Croft papers, 1/3/9-10. Resolution from
meeting of E.I.A. M.P.s in Page-Croft to Baldwin, 12 Nov. 1928; Page-Croft to Cunliffe-Lister,
28 Dec. 1928 and 5 jan . 1929 (copies), Baldwin papers, 29/49-50, 80, 87-8.
50
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Baldwin papers, 30/73-4. Amery diary, 5 Aug., 24 and 27 Sept., 12 and 31 Dec. 1928. See also
Amery encouraging Beaverbrook to begin a protection and imperial preference campaign in his
newspapers, Amery to Beaverbrook, Beaverbrook papers, House of Lords Record Office, c/5.
51
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in Beaverbrook to Borden, 26 Dec. 1928 and 30 Apr. 1929 (copies), Beaverbrook papers, c/52,
and in Hoare memo. 'The resignation of the second Baldwin government', June 1929, Temple-
wood papers, Cambridge University Library, v/4.
52
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Cunliffe-Lister to Baldwin, 11 Nov. 1928 Baldwin papers, 29/4-10.
53
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Birkenhead, Birkenhead, pp. 296-7.
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 E.g. Power repor ted in Jones diary, 11 Dec. 1928, p . 162; letters to I rw in from O r m s b y - G o r e ,
12 Dec. 1928, and from Hoare, 21 Jan. 1929, for 'many people' being 'depressed and defeatist'
before Christmas, Halifax papers, 152/18/186a, 205. For northern constituencies, Macmillan to
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to the view that the government might benefit from encouraging the hopes for
iron and steel safeguarding, particularly since the trade unions now seemed
to want it as well. With Amery he evolved a plan for a committee of inquiry
into the industry, which would hold out the prospect of action without
anything having to be done about it until after the election. The idea received
considerable attention from cabinet ministers in January 1929, but was
abandoned in February because Baldwin decided it was just too subtle.55 In
any case, party confidence was recovering again by then.58 Nevertheless, the
proposal shows that the government's safeguarding policy was still thought to
offer possibilities for electoral advantage.
There was still a third major policy which the government could develop
for the election. Almost all Conservatives believed that the empire could help
Britain considerably in overcoming its economic problems. Since one cause of
high unemployment was thought to be the decline in overseas emigration since
1914, Amery as Colonial and Dominions Secretary had tried hard to encourage
emigration to the Dominions. And because the empire seemed to be a huge
potential market for British goods, he had also tried to stimulate imperial trade
through the Empire Marketing Board which he had established in 1925. But
much of this effort had been frustrated, partly by the Dominion governments'
reluctance to receive unemployed men, but mostly, he thought, by Churchill's
slavish adherence to Treasury views about the wastefulness of expenditure on
such policies.57
However, during 1928 other ministers became increasingly interested in the
empire. Chamberlain in August and Baldwin and Steel-Maitland in November
wrote or spoke about the desirability of 'doing something more' for empire
development, though to little immediate effect.58 Following a report from the
Industrial Transference Board in June recommending that emigration should
receive even more encouragement, Chamberlain took up an idea of Hoare's
for the purchase by the British government of an estate in Canada on which
emigrants could be settled. Although the proposal was adopted in July by a
cabinet sub-committee on migration chaired by Worthington-Evans, ministers
discussed it intermittently for six months without result, in Chamberlain's view
because it was ' too spectacular' for Baldwin.59 But then in mid-February 1929
** See esp. Davidson reported in Amery diary, 29 Nov. and 17 Dec. 1928; Amery to Davidson,
30 Nov. 1928 (copy), Amery papers; and Davidson, Steel-Maitland and Cunliffe-Lister letters
of Dec. 1928 and Jan. 1929 in Baldwin papers, 29/54-105. Trade union opinion reported in
Larke to Cunliffe-Lister, 21 Dec. 1928 (copy), and request for inquiry into industry, Pugh (for
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation) to Baldwin, Baldwin papers, 29/79, 125-6. Cabinet
discussion in Amery diary, 30 Jan. and 6 Feb. 1929; and Cab 4(29) of 6 Feb. 1929.
** E.g. Hoare to Irwin, 21 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/205 for 'everyone' now being
'in better spirits'.
*' E.g. Amery to Steel-Maitland, 30 Nov. 1928 (copy), Amery papers; and Amery diary, 12
and 31 Dec. 1928.
68
 N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 12 Aug. 1928, Halifax papers, i52/ i8 / i i4a . Baldwin reported
in Amery diary, 6 Nov. 1928. Steel-Maitland reported in Amery to Steel-Maitland, 30 Nov. 1928
(copy), Amery papers.
»• Industrial Transference Board Report, C.P. 206(28) of 29 June 1928, CAB 24/196. N.
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Baldwin asked Worthington-Evans for a memorandum on the plan. On 19
February Davidson suggested to Baldwin that a large-scale policy of colonial
development should be introduced, in order to stimulate industry and
employment, create new markets, and demonstrate that the Conservative party
was 'still full of energy': he felt 'certain' that this 'tremendous policy' would
'fire the imagination of the country'.60 And Baldwin summoned a meeting on
22 February with Amery, Churchill, and Cunliffe-Lister to discuss making
what Amery described as an 'election splash' by announcing Worthington-
Evans' Canadian land settlement scheme. That meeting produced a row
between Churchill and Amery, with Churchill criticizing the scheme, Amery
arguing that any progress in empire development would require independence
from Treasury control, and Churchill then' boiling up with furious indignation'
at this 'challenge' to the Treasury and reverting to ideas for a further
elaboration of de-rating.61
In the event, the land settlement scheme had to be abandoned in early
March because of Canadian objections. But the wider issue of empire
development continued to be regarded as one of the main election policies.
Accordingly, in early April Churchill reluctantly agreed to the creation of an
imperial development fund, though he continued to cause difficulties over
Treasury control.62
Chamberlain's attitude is a sure indication of the importance attached to
imperial policy. In 1924 he had declined the Chancellorship of the Exchequer,
in order to go to what he considered to be politically the most crucial office
at that time, the Ministry of Health. Now in late 1928 and early 1929 he again
demurred to suggestions that he might go to the Treasury, and insisted that
he wanted to become Colonial Secretary. This may have been partly an act
of'filial piety': but it is unlikely that this would have sufficed unless he had
also believed that the office was going to become one of great significance.63
By February 1929 the Conservative government therefore had three major
policies available for use in an election campaign: de-rating and local government
reform, safeguarding, and empire development. And in addition social reforms
were being prepared: Chamberlain was working on an extensive programme
of slum clearance, and there were plans for appealing to the new women voters
with proposals for maternity benefits and child welfare. Any combination of
Chamberlain diary, 30 July 1928. For ministerial discussions, e.g. Amery and Churchill reported
in Jones to Hankey, 9 Oct. 1928, Jones diary, p. 146. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 16 Nov. 1928,
NC 18/1/634.
*° Worthington-Evans (enclosing memo.) to Baldwin, 16 Feb. 1928 (copy), Worthington-Evans
papers, c. 896/58-61. Davidson to Baldwin, 19 Feb. 1929 (copy), Davidson papers. See also Amery
diary, 24 Feb. 1929 for Davidson being 'very keen on some ambitious scheme of Empire
Development'.
" Amery diary, 22 Feb. 1929.
82
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Amery diary, 3 May 1929.
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these policies might have been placed at the forefront of the election campaign.
Moreover, in what was designed to be an electioneering budget on 15 April
Churchill, as well as abolishing the tea duty as another inducement for women
voters, tried to reactivate the appeal of de-rating by bringing agricultural relief
into operation at once.64 But as Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill
would cause difficulties if anything was done to give great prominence to
safeguarding or imperial development. In understanding just how far there was
a choice of election policies, it is therefore significant that in early March
Baldwin considered moving Churchill from the Treasury before the election,
and replacing him by Chamberlain, a protectionist with a strong interest in
economic development of the empire. But in order to understand the full
context of this proposed cabinet reconstruction, Conservative attitudes towards
their opponents must also be examined.
IV
Although the Labour party was the largest opposition party, most Conservative
politicians did not regard it as the main electoral threat in 1928 and early 1929.
They assumed that there was a natural anti-socialist - though not necessarily
Conservative — majority in the country, and thought that the Labour movement
was weakened by internal dissensions and poor leadership.65
The Liberal party was considered the greater threat - not because there was
any fear that it could obtain a parliamentary majority, but because it would
split the anti-socialist vote and thereby assist the Labour advance.66 Indeed,
this had been a major problem for Conservatives since the early 1920s. One
answer was an anti-socialist alliance with the Liberals. But after the defeat of
Conservative coalitionists in 1924, the dominant tactic had been to try and
crush the Liberal party, in order to establish a two-party system between
Conservatives and Labour. And this seemed to have been achieved at the 1924
election, when Liberals won only 40 seats.
However, the Liberal party had since recovered, and again seemed dangerous.
The worry was not that new Liberal policies were considered superior to
Conservative ideas; the publication in February 1928 of the Liberal Industrial
Inquiry's report, Britain's industrial future, aroused little comment. It was more
a matter of money, 'stunts', and numbers of candidates.67 Conservatives knew
64
 For Baldwin's interest in a 'maternity programme', see Jones diary, 19 Apr. 1929, p. 182.
For the budget offering electoral advantages, see e.g. A. Chamberlain to his wife, 16 Apr. 1929,
AC 6/1/756, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 29 Apr. 1929, NC 18/1/651. Churchill also wanted
to 'anticipate' industrial relief, but was prevented by inadequate funds, Churchill to Baldwin,
10 Apr. 1929, Baldwin papers, 36/126-7.
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 E.g. Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 8 July i928 ,NCi8 / i /6 i9 ; Davidson and Hoare to Irwin,
3 Dec. 1928 and 21 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/173, 205.
" E.g. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 9 Feb. 1929, NC 18/1/642; and Baldwin to Irwin, 25 Feb.
1929, Halifax papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, A4/410/14.3.
" E.g. Headlam diary, 10 Feb. 1928; N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 12 Aug. 1928, Halifax papers,
152/18/1143; and Birkenhead to Irwin, 13 Sept. 1928, Birkenhead, Birkenhead, pp. 295-6.
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that the size of their 1924 election victory owed much to support from former
Liberal, as well as non-committed, 'mugwump', voters, and that these
defections had not just been caused by the 'Red scare' and Conservative
policies. Other factors had included a split in the Liberal leadership and the
financial weakness of the Liberal party organization, which had contributed to
a fall in the number of Liberal candidates. But after Asquith's retirement in
late J£26, Lloyd George had captured control of the Liberal party organization
and given it large sums of money from his personal political fund. This enabled
The partyjo jaay not just for the development of new policies, but also for better.
"publicity, greater efforts in by-elections and, most threatening of all, a larger
number of candidates. By 1928 Conservatives knew that at the next general
election there would be about 150 more Liberal candidates than in 1924, and
as a result many more three-cornered constituency contests. All this seemed
likely to cost them some of their former support from Liberals and' mugwumps'.
Although few believed that this would enable the Labour party to obtain a
majority, there was clearly a danger that the Conservative majority might be
so reduced that Liberals would hold the balance of power in parliament.
Yet this danger was usually discounted. Divisions remained within the
Liberal party, and were thought to be damaging; Liberal by-election successes
were ascribed to intensive local campaigns which could not be sustained at
a general election; and in so far as there was considered to be a Liberal revival,
it was regarded as mostly an illusion created by money, rather than as a
genuine increase in support.68 Moreover, the fierce hostility of many Conserv-
atives towards Lloyd George, and Liberals in general, induced a belief that
he was discredited and the party beyond recovery.69 So, to take just the chief
examples, Davidson and Neville Chamberlain denied that there was any ' real
sign' of a Liberal revival.70
There was, however, one Conservative leader who began with a different
attitude towards the election, and that was Churchill. A former Liberal and
coalitionist, and an aggressive anti-socialist who shared Baldwin's fears about
democracy but lacked his faith in the people, he regarded Labour as the
immediate threat and remained sympathetic towards Liberals, particularly
Lloyd George. In January 1929 he urged Baldwin to do ' every thing... to
confront the electors with the direct choice between Socialism and modern
Conservatism'; on 12 February he did this himself in a strongly anti-socialist
68
 E.g. N. Chamberlain, Davidson and Hoare to Irwin, respectively 12 Aug. and 3 Dec. 1928,
and 21 Jan. 1929, Halifax papers 152/18/114a, 173, 205; Headlam diary, 7 May 1929; and esp.
Astor to Garvin, 22 May 1929 (copy), Astor papers: 'if it wasn't for [L.G.'s] ill-gotten fund there
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" Esp. N. Chamberlain to Irwin, 12 Aug. 1928, Halifax papers, 152/18/1148, for being
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they are doomed to a creeping paralysis'.
70
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Halifax papers, 152/18/173. N. Chamberlain to his wife, and to Ida Chamberlain, 30 Oct. 1928
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speech; and six days later he was interested in an approach from Lloyd George
for a Conservative-Liberal alliance if the Liberals held the balance after the
election.71 But on the other hand he too was worried that Liberal interventions
would split the anti-socialist vote, and his main interest in talking with Lloyd
George was to suggest an 'electoral understanding' to reduce the number of
three-cornered contests. So when it became apparent that Lloyd George
would persist in what Churchill described as 'mad-dogging all the constitu-
encies', he joined other Conservatives in castigating the Liberals.72
These Conservative attitudes towards the Liberal party were not substantially
changed by Lloyd George's pledge on i March 1929 to 'cure' unemployment
within two years, nor by the publication twelve days later of his detailed pro-
gramme, We can conquer unemployment: they were only intensified. Conservative
leaders were even less worried than previously by the actual content of Liberal
policies, because none believed that this new programme was realistic. Neville
Chamberlain thought that Lloyd George's speech was 'merely ridiculous';
Austen Chamberlain that the 'reckless[ness]' of his promises demonstrated
that he never expected to have to fulfil them; and Churchill that Lloyd George
knew from his experience as prime minister that large-scale national work-
schemes were impracticable.73 So the unemployment programme was regarded
as merely an election 'stunt', and it was attacked as such in public speeches.
But ministers also believed that they had conclusive replies to the Liberal
proposals: that the work-schemes would take longer than two years, would not
provide the number of jobs claimed, and were inappropriate for skilled men;
that they would not increase the capacity of industry to provide 'permanent'
employment, but would create only 'temporary' and 'unproductive' work;
and that the loans required to finance them would divert funds from productive
industry, weaken the budget and jeopardize business confidence: in sum, that
the Liberal plan would disrupt the gradual recovery of trade and industry
which was being assisted by the government's policies, especially de-rating.74
71
 Churchill to Baldwin, 7 Jan. 1929, Baldwin papers, 164/30-2, adding that 'the more blunt
and simple the issue, the better for our cause'. Churchill speech to the Anti-Socialist and
Anti-Communist Union, at Queen's Hall, London, 12 Feb. 1929, The Times, 13 Feb. Lloyd
George, 'Note of an interview with.. .Churchill', 18 Feb. 1929, Lloyd George papers, House of
Lords Record Office, G/4/4/23.
72
 Churchill to Baldwin, 2 Sept. 1928, Baldwin papers, 36/76-7, for Liberals 'queerfing] the
pitch'. 'Note of an interview with.. .Churchill', 18 Feb. 1929, Lloyd George papers, G/4/4/23.
Churchill speech at Queen's Hall, reported in The Times, 13 Feb. 1929. But he remained alarmed
by the attitude of some of his colleagues: see Garvin to Astor, 10 Apr. 1929, Astor papers, for
Churchill complaining that ' the Diehards in the Cabinet... hate Lloyd George so much that if
they can't win themselves they would hand over the country to socialism or the devil to thwart
[him]'.
73
 Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 Mar. 1929, NC 18/1/645; A- Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd,
15 Mar. 1929 (copy), AC 55/356; and Churchill reported in Jones diary, 6 Mar. 1929, p. 176.
74
 For all this, see speeches by Conservative ministers for March to May 1929.
Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, calculated that if the ordinary 'absorptive' powers of
industry were allowed to continue their operation without disruption from strikes and 'hasty
measures', unemployment would be reduced to normal by 'about 1935': memo. 'Analysis of the
present unemployment situation', 23 Apr. 1929, Worthington-Evans papers, c. 923/12-3.
SAFETY FIRST 403
Conservative leaders, then, expected to have the best of the policy debate,
and most remained confident of winning the election.75 Nevertheless it was
evident that the Liberal unemployment campaign increased the danger frqrn
the 500 Liberal candidates: equipped with~an impressive-sounding policyAthey ^
"now had a greater chance of deluding a sufficient number of voters to prevent
the Conservatives frpm retaining an overainhajbritjr. The problem was to find
"The best way of counteracting the Literal appeal amongst that large part of
the electorate which it was feared might be more attracted by 'stunts' than by
solid argument.
Baldwin was probably more preoccupied by the Liberal threat than any
other leading Conservative. He was one of the chief enemies of Lloyd George,
a strong anti-coalitionist, and one of the authors of the anti-Liberal tactics in
1923-4. So he rejected all ideas of co-operation with Liberals, such as those
brought by Churchill in February. But he was sufficiently worried by the
Liberal unemployment campaign to discuss with Neville Chamberlain on 5
March the possibility that Lloyd George might obtain the parliamentary
balance of power.76
Faced with this renewed threat, Baldwin's first reaction was to consider an
early reconstruction of the cabinet. Reconstruction had been discussed
intermittently since August 1928, because several ministers wanted to retire
and others seemed too old or too ill to continue. Neville Chamberlain,
Churchill and Amery were among those who wanted changes before the
election, in the belief that this would assist the government during the election
campaign.77 By February Baldwin had a new cabinet in mind, with Churchill at
the India Office: but so far he had ignored advice about an early reconstruction,
and was thinking only of changes after the election.78 However, on 4 March,
ten days after witnessing the argument between Churchill and Amery over
Empire development, and three days after Lloyd George's unemployment
pledge, he suddenly showed interest in Amery's proposal for moving Churchill
from the Treasury before the election, as the main feature in a reconstruction
designed to give 'a fillip to public interest'. On the following day he discussed
the proposal with Neville Chamberlain, and pressed him in highly flattering
terms to accept the Treasury. On 11 March he spoke to Chamberlain of
" E.g. Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 9 and 24 Mar. 1929, NC 18/1/646, 648; Amery to
Stonehaven, 20 Mar. 1929, Stonehaven papers, microfilm lent by the National Library of
Australia, Canberra; Bridgeman to Baldwin, 27 Mar. 1929, Baldwin papers, 175/50-1; and
Baldwin reported in Dawson to Irwin, 8 Apr. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/241.
" N. Chamberlain diary, 11 Mar. 1929, referring to 5 Mar. See also Baldwin reported in Jones
diary, 5 Mar. 1929, p. 174.
77
 N. Chamberlain to Irwin, i2Aug. 1928, Halifax papers, 152/18/1148; Churchill to Baldwin,
2 Sept. 1928, Baldwin papers, 36/26-7; N. Chamberlain and Amery in Amery diary, 27 Feb. 1929.
See also Birkenhead to Irwin, 13 Sept. 1928, Birkenhead, Birkenhead, pp. 295-6; Dawson (editor
of The Times) memo, of talk with Baldwin, 24 Sept. 1928, in John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson
and our Times (London, 1955), pp. 265-6.
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'drastic changes to come just before the election', and although by the 24th
he had yielded to Chamberlain's preference for the Colonial Office, he
continued to mention reconstruction for at least another three weeks.79
Baldwin was probably influenced by the argument that an early cabinet
reconstruction would in itself stimulate public interest. But the circumstances
of his interest in the idea strongly suggest that he also wanted to clear the way
for replying to Lloyd George's unemployment campaign with a large advance
in Conservative policy, most likely in empire development. The removal of
Churchill from the Treasury would ease the adoption of such a programme
in cabinet, and demonstrate the government's commitment to new policies
to the party and the electorate.
There was no cabinet reconstruction even though Churchill continued to be
obstructive about empire development, safeguarding and imperial preferences,
and although Amery told Baldwin that Neville Chamberlain's appointment
to the Treasury would be worth ' twenty or thirty seats'.80 Nor were de-rating,
safeguarding or empire development made into the central themes of the
Conservative election campaign. This was despite a serious decline in the
confidence of the Conservative rank-and-file, and the loss of two by-elections
to the Liberals and one to Labour on 20 and 21 March.81 Neville Chamberlain
noted on 9 March that Conservative M.P.s were 'suffering from a bad attack
of defeatism', though he could see' nothing substantial to warrant it'. Ten days
later Headlam, a junior minister, wrote that ' our people are gloomy, and really
there is nothing said or done to encourage them by the Cabinet'; and like
Macmillan, another northern M.P., he now feared an election 'debacle'
comparable to igo6.82 This depression had been precipitated by the Liberal
" Amery diary, 4 Mar. 1929; and Amery to Baldwin, 11 Mar. 1929, Baldwin papers, 36/88-92.
Jones diary, 5 Mar. 1929, p. 174. N. Chamberlain diary, 11 Mar. 1929 (also referring to 5 Mar.).
Neville to Ida, and to Hilda Chamberlain 24 Mar. and 12 Apr. 1929, NC 18/1/648, 650. Dawson
to Irwin, 8 Apr. 1929, Halifax papers, 152/18/243.
Pace Ramsden, Conservative party policy, p. 30, in view of Chamberlain's known interests and
expected appointment as Colonial Secretary, it is not surprising that he was asked to write on
colonial policy for the election manifesto.
80
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 Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 9 and 24 Mar. 1929, NC 18/1/646, 648. Headlam diary, 18
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unemployment campaign: but it was exacerbated by criticism from the main
mass-circulation newspapers, Davidson and Churchill having failed in their
attempts to conciliate Rothermere and Beaverbrook during the previous
year.83
The reason why there were no cabinet changes nor any special stress upon
particular policies was that by early April Baldwin had thought of another
method of replying to Lloyd George's campaign. He had policies, but what
he really wanted was an effective theme. The one he chose was not particularly
novel. Neville Chamberlain and Churchill both thought it would be ' a mistake
to try and outbid' Lloyd George.84 In public speeches all Conservatives were
attacking Lloyd George's record of broken pledges and the worthlessness of his
latest promises, and were emphasizing the government's past achievements as
a guarantee for the soundness of its present policies. But Baldwin converted
such ideas into the chief element in the Conservative campaign, claimed it as
a positive virtue that he was making no promises, and added a distinctive
personal appeal for trust. In this he may have been influenced by Bridgeman,
whose letter to him on 27 March is a good statement of the reasoning behind
Baldwin's appeal, in particular that it was not defensive in intention.
I . . . hope that you will not attempt to outbid L[loyd] Gfeorge] or the Socialists in a
vote-catching programme.. .it is folly to attempt a competition with irresponsible
people, and I believe L.G.'s proposals have given us an opportunity of attacking, instead
of defending ourselves...
I feel sure we can win if we show no signs of panic, and our only safe course is to
depend on our record, and make as few promises... as possible.86
Nevertheless, the choice of election platform was very much Baldwin's own
responsibility. Although he consulted some individual ministers about particular
proposals and described his general ideas to Neville Chamberlain, he only
allowed the cabinet a ' preliminary consideration' of the election programme
before he drafted his opening speech for the campaign.86 The speech was
written during a weekend at Chequers, with Thomas Jones drafting paragraphs
83
 For criticism, e.g. Araery to Stonehaven, 20 Mar. 1929, Stonehaven papers; Neville to Ida
Chamberlain, 24 Mar. 1929, NC 18/1/648; Bridgeman to Baldwin, 27 Mar. 1929, Baldwin
papers, 175/50-1.
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on specific policies, but Baldwin himself providing the themes.87 When he did
outline his speech to the cabinet, on 17 April, he said that he intended to
concentrate on 'what the government had already accomplished, what it was
working for, and its ideals', and to give only the 'general lines' of its future
programme, avoiding 'details and promises'. He therefore 'deprecated dis-
cussion of.. .detailed proposals', with the result that the terms of the Conserva-
tive election campaign were accepted after what Amery described as only ' a
perfunctory five minutes discussion'.88
At Drury Lane on 18 April, Baldwin told a Conservative party meeting that
in contrast to the ' palliatives' offered by Lloyd George and the Socialists, the
government's policy was to create 'permanent employment' by assisting 'the
modernization of industry at home and the multiplication of markets overseas'.
He spoke of his efforts to improve industrial relations, and the emergence of
a 'new spirit' since the General Strike which had put 'fresh life' into
industrialists and encouraged them to undertake rationalization, so that
industry was recovering its competitiveness, trade was improving, and unem-
ployment was falling. He described de-rating as ' the greatest assistance that
has ever been given to industry' and safeguarding as a 'most valuable adjunct'
to it in producing employment, and he sketched out proposals for extending
colonial development. He also talked about advances in factory legislation,
labour transference and training, emigration, railway modernization, agri-
cultural improvement, slum clearance, education, maternity care and child
welfare. But his main theme was that the Conservative party was the ' party
of performance', not promises: it had a good record of achievement, was
proposing to pursue tried and tested policies, and did not promise anything
it could not hope to perform. He offered a 'policy of sobriety', spoke about
the 'tremendous' responsibilities of the first 'complete democracy', and
expressed confidence that the 'deep sense of responsibility of our people' would
deafen them to 'the appeals of cupidity.. .and credulity'.89 It was this theme
which the Conservative Central Office and their advertising agents tried to
summarize in the slogan 'Safety First'.
Baldwin was recalling the message he had expounded throughout the 1920s,
and trusting that a good part of the new electorate had now learnt the need
for stability, ordered progress, common sense, responsibility and honesty. As
before, this message was directed against the socialist threat of class warfare
and nationalization. But now it was primarily being used to highlight the
danger from Lloyd George: linked to a deliberate understatement of new
Conservative policies, it was intended to represent his elaborate programme
and promises as impractical, dishonest and highly irresponsible. As Baldwin
told Jones a few days later, he was ' banking on the decency of the English
people', in the belief that they would recognize the government's good work
87
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and not be 'deluded by Ll.G.'.90 Indeed in later speeches, in response to
considerable popular interest in his election tour, he went further and invoked
a special relationship of trust between himself and the electorate: he emphasized
his commitment to democracy and readiness to accept its verdict, and
introduced increasingly personal appeals, culminating in his eve-of-poll
message - 'You trusted me before, and I ask you to trust me again'.91
Party reactions to Baldwin's speech were mostly favourable. Given an
outline of the programme beforehand, Neville Chamberlain had thought it
'seemed pretty good - sounds practical and contrasts well with L.G.', and
afterwards found that the speech was generally regarded as 'quite satisfactory'.
Amery thought it struck 'an effective keynote', Austen Chamberlain that it
provided 'an admirable electoral guide'. Several northern Conservatives told
Baldwin that it was 'just right for them', and Headlam thought he had now
given them a 'sound lead'.92 Although there were some critics who wanted
more positive statements, many came to see that 'Safety First' did not exclude
having policies. For example Astor complained at first that there was nothing
'big and constructive', but at the end of the campaign wrote that Baldwin had
done 'well.. .in developing a progressive programme'.93 And for the many
Conservatives who believed that Baldwin personally had considerable popular
appeal, it seemed an advantage that the campaign concentrated attention
upon his character and record. One reason for Neville Chamberlain's confidence
was that he thought 'the Baldwin legend appeal[ed] pretty strongly to
women' - an important consideration in the first election dominated by
women voters. Indeed, the Earl of Crawford, a former Conservative chief whip,
observed during the election campaign that ' Baldwin is really our chief asset,
and it is almost in fact a one man show'.94
Since the emphasis was upon performance and continuity, it no longer
seemed appropriate to reconstruct the Cabinet before the election. Furthermore,
because the appeal was for trust rather than a mandate for specific purposes,
Baldwin took little interest in the preparation of his election address; instead
it was drafted by a large committee of ministers. In retrospect this seemed an
unsatisfactory procedure making for an incoherent programme: but at the time
Neville Chamberlain, who might have been expected to be worried about such
90
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things, considered that it had produced a ' pretty impressive document'.95 The
address was supported by the publication in early May of a government White
Paper containing departmental criticisms of the Liberal unemployment
programme. Since ministers were not impressed by the ' boldness' of these
Liberal policies, this publication was not motivated by fear (as is usually
implied), but by a belief that it would finally discredit Lloyd George. Davidson
claimed that 'LI.G.'s.. .scheme has been blown out of the water, and is
generally treated with levity'.96
With such attitudes, Conservative leaders remained confident of victory. In
early May Neville Chamberlain found that the average calculation was an
overall majority of forty to fifty, but he personally expected an even better
result. Eyres-Monsell, the chief whip, predicted a majority of eighty. According
to Chamberlain, Baldwin himself was in ' very good spirits' as he began his
election tour, believing there was ' no steam in the socialists' and relishing ' the
prospect of possibly laying out L.G., Rothermere and Beaverbrook all at one
go'-97
VI
So 'Safety First' was not a substitute for lack of ideas and policies: it was
deliberately chosen by Baldwin from a number of possible election platforms.
It was not defensive, but a calculated attempt to discredit Lloyd George. It
relied heavily on Baldwin's leadership and on his success over the years in
persuading the new democracy not to be seduced by socialist abstractions, trade
union militancy or Liberal demagogy, but to accept Conservative values as
the guarantee of liberty and secure social improvement. And it was expected
to be successful.
The election, held on 30 May, showed that Conservative leaders had
underestimated the impact of unemployment, and overestimated the appeal
of Baldwin. But there were two other features which probably magnified the
inaccuracy of Conservative predictions. As compared to 1924, the electorate
had increased by a third and, owing to the increased Liberal challenge, the
number of three-cornered contests had doubled to a total of 447 - this being
the only election in which the three major parties each had over 500 candidates.
Half the seats were won on minority votes. Although the Conservative party
obtained a majority of votes, it suffered a net loss of 140 seats and was left with
only 260 M.P.s. Labour becarhe the largest party with 287 seats, but failed
" ('
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to win an overall majority. The Liberal party, with 59 M.P.s, held the
parliamentary balance of power.
The defeat was a shock to Conservatives, and especially to Baldwin. Various
explanations were produced for it, but the intervention of Liberal candidates
financed by Lloyd George seemed decisive in turning over a good number of
seats to Labour. So hostility towards Lloyd George reached a climax. No
Conservative leader proposed an alliance with Liberals to prevent Labour
forming a government, but almost all of them wanted to meet parliament in
order to force upon Lloyd George the odium of putting socialists in office.98
However, Baldwin's decision to resign at once followed from his attitude
throughout the election campaign. He had appealed for trust and been denied
it; had pledged himself to accept the verdict of the democracy; did not want
to appear to be cheating Labour of office; and above all was obsessed by fears
of the damage Lloyd George might inflict upon a Conservative government
by wielding the balance of power. So Baldwin insisted on handing over
immediately to MacDonald the problems of governing on Liberal sufferance."
A longer-term consequence of the election defeat was that Conservative faith
in the ' Baldwin legend' was shaken, and his leadership thereby became highly
vulnerable. Only by understanding the confidence in Baldwin and 'Safety
First' before the 1929 election can the subsequent reaction against him be fully
appreciated.
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